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ABSTRACT
Most of  the Spanish territory is marked by Mediterranean climatic characteristics, in which rain irregularity and droughts present 
continuous challenges to water resource managers. Since the end of  the 19th century, the country has adopted a management logic 
based on flow regularization from dam construction and basin water transfers. However, from the Water Framework Directive adopted 
in 2000, European Union member states are forced to undertake more environmentally oriented management processes, with a focus 
on improving the ecological status of  water bodies. In this sense, economic management tools have been highlighted in the national 
strategies for compliance with the Water Framework Directive requirements. One of  those instruments is the public water use rights 
permit. This paper aims to present the Spanish panorama of  this instrument and contribute to those interested in water management. 
The work shows that there are several challenges and problems faced by the Spanish management apparatus, particularly regarding 
continuity of  private management of  groundwater and insufficient knowledge of  numerous wells and volumes of  water used. For various 
reasons, the concessions system faces criticism as to defending the interests of  traditional economic sectors.
Keywords: Water use rights concession; Water resources management; Spain water management.
RESUMEN
Gran parte del territorio español es marcado por características climáticas mediterráneas, en que la irregularidad pluviométrica y los 
estiajes se constituyen en retos continuados a los gestores de recursos hídricos. Desde el final del siglo XIX, España ha adoptado una 
lógica de gestión basada en la regularización de caudales a partir de la construcción de presas y de transferencias hídricas entre cuencas. 
Sin embargo, a partir de la Directiva Marco del Agua los países miembros de la Unión Europea han sido forzados a buscaren objetivos 
más ambientales, centrados en la mejora del estado ecológico de las masas de agua. En ese sentido, los instrumentos económicos 
tienen destaque en las estrategias nacionales de adecuación a las exigencias de la Directiva. Este artículo intenta presentar el panorama 
español de aplicación de la concesión de derechos de usos del agua. Hay una serie de retos y problemas confrontados por el aparato 
gestor español, particularmente la continuidad de la gestión privada de aguas subterráneas y el desconocimiento de gran parte de los 
pozos y de los volúmenes utilizados. Por este y otros motivos, el sistema de concesiones enfrenta críticas cuanto a la defensa de los 
intereses de sectores económicos tradicionales en el país.
Palabras clave: Concesiones de derecho de uso del agua; Gestión de recursos hídricos; Gestión del agua en España.
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INTRODUCTION
The Mediterranean conditions that affect two thirds of  
the Spanish territory make the country the most arid of  Europe 
(LLAMAS et al., 2015) and shape different management challenges 
for neighboring countries. Rainfall irregularity and frequent 
droughts aggravate the connection between water availability 
and demands. This framework was traditionally taken as a cause 
of  “hydrological and socio-economic imbalances” between the 
North Atlantic “wet Spain” and the Mediterranean “dry Spain” 
(GARCÍA FERNÁNDEZ, 2004). Hydraulic policies to increase 
supply and the disorderly processes of  land occupation and water 
use have led to severe degradation and artificialization of  aquatic 
systems. In fact, water management is one of  the most important 
challenges for Spanish society in the 21st century.
Spain is one of  the precursor countries for water management 
institutionalization. The Cortes de Cádiz, which approved the 
Constitution of  1812, established the public character of  hydraulic 
use and intensified political concerns regarding water planning 
(SÁNCHEZ-MARTÍNEZ et al., 2011). The Water Law of  1866 
was the first water regulation code in the world, but it had a 
short duration of  only two years. The Centenary Law of  Water 
was in force between 1879 and 1985. In 1985 the Water Law was 
passed, regulating the general framework of  the terrestrial waters 
domain ever since.
From the 1990s, a more intense polarization of  positions 
concerning the traditional water management models based on 
increased water supply was noted. Pressures were driven by social 
movements and by the Water Framework Directive (WFD - 
Directive 60/2000, October 23), which established a community 
management framework (EU, 2000). Environmental sustainability, 
subsidiarity, the search for efficiency, and social participation in 
management processes are transversal principles of  the WFD 
(GRAY et al., 2016). The WFD considers that water is not a 
commercial good but rather a heritage that must be protected. The 
central objective of  water policies should be to restore the “[…] 
good ecological and chemical status of  surface water bodies and 
the good quantitative and chemical status of  groundwater, with 
a more environmental perspective than that of  water traditional 
approaches” (EU, 2000).
By seeking system modernization and WFD fulfillment, the 
management system has been proposing and applying instruments 
that bring advances as well as criticisms. This article presents 
the Spanish implementation framework for one of  the main 
instruments: the administrative concessions of  water use rights, 
since water is a public resource. From a traditional experience, 
we hope to contribute to reflections in Brazil and other countries. 
In addition to the extensive bibliographic review, other sources 
of  information were used through informal conversations with 
specialists and participation in events.
GEOGRAPHICAL FRAMEWORK AND WATER 
USES
Spain has an area of  504,645 km2 and one of  the largest 
populations in Europe: 46,438,000 inhabitants (INE, 2016). 
In addition to the mainland, the country covers the Balearic and 
Canary Islands and the autonomous cities of  Ceuta and Melilla 
in North Africa. Much of  the territory is typically Mediterranean 
in its variations of  aridity and semi-aridity. The southeastern part 
of  the country is the driest region of  the Iberian Peninsula, with 
average precipitation that often does not exceed 300 mm of  
annual rainfall (GIL OLCINA, 2002, 2008). In recent decades, 
climatic variables have been changed that may aggravate the water 
availability framework, as there are several records of  rainfall 
reduction and rising temperatures in the country’s basins (ESPAÑA, 
2007; OLCINA CANTOS et al., 2016). Among the largest and 
most important river basins in the country are those of  the Ebro, 
Guadalquivir, Júcar, and Segura rivers, but more than half  of  the 
territory is inserted in five other international basins shared with 
Portugal: Miño, Limia, Duero, Tajo, and Guadiana. Frequently, the 
fluvial regime is expressed in a hybrid behavior of  the dynamics 
of  the temporary ramblas and the perennial Mediterranean rivers.
Spain has undergone significant changes following the country’s 
entry into the European Union in 1986. Industrialization, expansion 
of  irrigated agriculture, and the explosion of  “sun and beach” 
tourism have been the most prominent causes of  these changes. 
In the Mediterranean zone, the tourism industry is responsible 
for completely transforming many territories and contributing 
to urban expansion. This tourism is strongly concentrated in the 
summer, intensifying the water demands between July and August 
and strongly pressing the aquifers.
With such changes, demands for water have increased 
dramatically from the beginning of  the 20th century. Spain is the 
European Union country with the highest demand for water for 
irrigation (RODRÍGUEZ CASADO et al., 2008). About 68% 
of  the water goes to the agricultural sector, 18% to the industrial 
sector, and 14% for domestic uses (FAO, 2016). However, in 
recent years, there has been a decline in domestic, industrial, and 
agricultural demands, thanks to higher tariffs and modernization 
of  the urban supply and irrigation systems. Irrigated areas cover 
a third of  the country’s cultivated land but produce more than 
55% of  the country’s agricultural products (HERNÁNDEZ-
MORA et al., 2014). Further, 15-20% of  the water used comes 
from aquifers, but Spain is one of  the European countries that 
uses the least groundwater (HERNÁNDEZ-MORA et al., 2007). 
Meanwhile, the percentage increases to almost 35% of  the total 
water used for domestic uses, which can reach 100% in the Balearic 
and Canary Islands (MOLINERO et al., 2011).
Modern irrigated agriculture is subsidized by the State 
and European Union, and it is mainly based on the production 
of  cereals, forage plants, and industrial crops. At the same time, 
extensive areas produce rainfed crops, especially olive groves 
and vineyards. On the other hand, practically without State and 
European support, small family production is responsible for 
fruit and vegetable crops irrigated with groundwater. Production 
is destined for export and presents better results of  profitability.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONCESSIONS OF WATER 
USE RIGHTS IN SPAIN
The WFD represents a fundamental change in the prospects 
for water management in European Union member countries. 
However, it does not prejudge with good understanding or affect 
the regime of  water ownership (CAPONERA, 2003; BOISSON 
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DE CHAZOURNES; TIGNINO, 2016). The WFD simply 
establishes requirements to obtain results about the ecological 
and chemical status of  river and aquifer ecosystems, whether 
publicly or privately owned. However, these requirements represent 
important frameworks for changes in management logic regarding 
concessional water systems, which is a dimension of  the private 
use of  public goods.
As a public good and as defined by the Spanish Constitution 
of  1978, water must be used only with the authorization of  the 
State. There are three types of  water use rights authorizations in 
the Spanish legal system, which can be reviewed under exceptional 
conditions (HERNÁNDEZ-MORA et al., 2014; HERNÁNDEZ-
MORA; DEL MORAL, 2015). One of  them refers to the 
administrative concessions granted by the State for different 
uses for a maximum period of  75 years; these are renewable. 
This category includes the historical licenses granted by the State 
to associations of  irrigators, created mainly between 1940 and 
1980, and which are maintained over time, although with the legal 
incorporation of  the public hydraulic domain. Thus, water use 
and management are carried out by user associations (irrigation 
communities), and much of  the irrigation water (about 80%) falls 
into this category. Finally, there are groundwater use rights that 
remains private, requiring approval based on the Water Law of  
1985; almost all uses of  groundwater follow this private system. 
Under certain conditions and requirements, the law also allows 
use rights contracts between private users and user associations 
in a “water markets” judgement.
The Water Law has established that all Spanish waters, 
surface or underground, are in the public domain of  the State, 
with the need for administrative concessions for their use, except 
for the previous regime of  private underground waters. Therefore, 
a concession is an instrument that allows the private use of  the 
public hydraulic domain under certain legal conditions, such as 
maximum permitted flows, ecological flows (which must be kept in 
the streams) and validity terms. The Water Law of  1985 (ESPAÑA, 
1985) and the Revised Text of  the Water Law – RTWL (ESPAÑA, 
2001) specifies that the authority to grant concessions for water 
use rests with the basin organizations. The Public Hydraulic 
Domain Regulation also determines that the basin organizations 
are responsible for discharge authorizations into the water systems 
in the case of  direct (not treated) effluents in surface waters and 
direct and indirect effluents in groundwater.
According to the legislation, the basin plans must establish 
that the domestic supply is the priority for water use, followed by 
irrigation and other agricultural uses, industrial uses, aquaculture, 
recreational uses, and navigation (ESPAÑA, 2001). Any concession 
may be revoked and expropriated in favor of  another previous 
use. The RTWA also establishes that the concession duration 
cannot exceed 75 years, except for specific cases with extension 
possibilities.
In this sense, Brufao (2008, p. 60) warns that power decisions 
to grant an individual a public good during this maximum period 
of  75 years is based, in practice, on the mere will or intentions 
of  the managers at the given time. With the many possibilities 
for exceptions and extensions given by legislation, the maximum 
period can be converted into situations of  perpetual use, forming 
a picture of  “patrimonialization” of  a good that “naively was 
thought to be public”.
Legislation allows the review of  concessions in exceptional 
situations, such as prolonged droughts or excessive pressures on 
available water resources, but the State commonly views the revision 
as a politically and economically draining process (HERNÁNDEZ-
MORA; DEL MORAL, 2015). As a result, many users consider 
that State concessions represent perpetual rights to private water 
ownership. In this sense, Arrojo (2006) affirms that this rigidity 
of  the concession system creates a panorama of  solidified private 
property rights of  entire rivers, mainly by irrigators and the electric 
sector. This means that, in Spain, the water as a public good is 
hardly an administrative formality. The almost inexistence of  
inspection and control in riparian public domain areas aggravates 
management in favor of  the private perspective.
In practice, however, basin organizations usually set 
concession deadlines that are less than the 75 years as the maximum 
allowable period. As an example, the Catalan Water Agency (Agencia 
Catalana del Agua) defines, in the decree approving the Catalan 
River Basin District management plan for the 2016-2021 period 
(ACA, 2016), that the maximum term in its management area is 
50 years for the municipal supply and 25 years for other uses. In the 
case of  the urban supply sector, investments in infrastructure and 
management devices to be implemented by concession agencies 
certainly contribute to this longer term perspective, which is also 
the context in Brazil. Without guarantees of  these longer periods, 
mixed or private companies would not feel motivated to assume 
the risks associated with services and recovery of  invested costs.
The fact that water in Spain is legally public and its use 
must be controlled by State concessions has similarities to the 
Brazilian experience. In Brazil, the public concession of  water 
use rights (outorga) is one of  the management tools proposed by 
the National Water Resources Policy of  1997. However, there is 
an important difference. In Brazil, there are no acquired rights 
with respect to the private waters that existed prior to the Federal 
Constitution of  1988, when the public waters domain was defined.
In Spain, on the contrary, the Water Law of  1985 maintained 
certain aspects of  the previous private property system, as 
mentioned above (ESPAÑA, 1985). Since then, two options have 
been offered to water owners. One is the permanence of  private 
ownership for an indefinite period from approval granted via the 
Water Act and inscription in a Private Water Catalog. This process 
could enable the State to draw up a water use inventory to assist 
in planning and management. The other option refers to cases in 
which the user would agree, from then on, to convert its waters 
to public use. In such situations, they should be registered in the 
Water Register, maintaining the same use rights and conditions 
for 50 years, from which they have priority in the regime of  
concessions in force. To facilitate and motivate the transition of  
the private water owner’s system to the concession regime, the 
Water Law opened the possibility that any use foreseen in the 
Registry or in the Catalog can be transformed into an administrative 
concession at any time.
The State defined a period of  three years (until 1988) for all 
users to define their legal status. However, 80-90% of  the country’s 
wells were not yet declared or registered; thus, private ownership 
was maintained (LLAMAS et al., 2015). Additionally, thousands of  
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wells were opened without State control, forming a true picture of  
“hydrological insubordination” (LLAMAS, 2004). The significant 
lack of  data and updating of  the Water Register and the Water 
Catalog have created a framework of  delays in the groundwater 
management apparatus. Most of  the wells are unknown, and 
there is a lack of  data on catchments and users. Another problem 
involves the deficiencies in experience and a cultural understanding 
of  basin organizations in managing groundwater, since they had 
always been more accustomed to applying waterworks policies in 
surface waterbodies (MOLINERO et al., 2011).
In this way, the current scenario is reflected in a peculiar 
management model. The Water Law of  1985 defines that all waters 
are in the public domain, but the reality is different. Surface water 
management is carried out by public power through the concession 
system, but groundwater continues to be privately owned because 
of  previously recognized rights. Therefore, contrary to the Water 
Law, practically all groundwater remains under private ownership 
according to the transitional provisions of  the Water Law and 
social inertia (ARROJO, 2006).
Deficiencies of  groundwater inventory and registration 
aggravate this situation, with a significant lack of  knowledge and 
control of  the wells (many of  them illegal). According to this 
argument, Sahuquillo et al. (2008) stated that, after more than 20 
years of  the Water Law, and despite the granting of  moratoria, 
the situation of  groundwater in Spain is “chaotic”:
It is not well known how many uses there are, and 
thousands of  drillings have been made (perhaps most of  
them) without permission or concession from the basin 
organizations, which are the ones that must approve 
them. These agencies are unable to control them and do 
not have the means, support, or appropriate guidelines 
to do so. It also seems that a very important part of  
private water owners has not accepted the offer to enroll 
in the Registry and were not registered in the Catalog. 
(SAHUQUILLO et al., 2008, p. 10).
Water concession regimes can also be used in the management 
of  demand, either by normative or economic instruments. In the first 
case, managers can adopt strategies to modify concessions granted 
with the objective of  releasing water resources for new concessions 
or environmental purposes (improving the ecological status of  
water bodies). Possibilities include the revision of  concessions 
when previously granted rights can be reduced or canceled, the 
forced expropriation of  concession rights in cases of  public 
utility, or the expiration of  non-renewable use rights concession 
periods (HERNÁNDEZ-MORA; DEL MORAL, 2016). These 
strategies are not easy to apply in Spain, depending on political, 
economic, administrative, and judicial complications. Thus, they are 
effectively restricted to the theoretical perspective. This situation 
has inspired the employment of  economic instruments aimed at 
reducing demands, such as hydraulic systems modernization and 
application of  tariffs and fees. Most water resources not used 
according to these measures are affiliated with the agricultural 
sector and are used to address new uses with more social impact, 
mainly urban uses, environmental protection, and recovery of  
water bodies. However, agricultural practices modernization has 
been used basically to increase the irrigable area.
WATER USE RIGHTS NEGOTIATIONS
Another option for water management economic instruments 
in Spain involves water markets. They are decentralized mechanisms 
that allow users to transfer voluntary use rights in exchange 
for an economic counterpart (HERNÁNDEZ-MORA; DEL 
MORAL, 2016). For centuries, informal water exchanges have been 
implemented in Spain, mainly in the Mediterranean region because 
of  the importance of  its water availability and overexploitation 
problems. However, they are small-scale initiatives involving 
relatively low water volumes. Purchase and sales agreements or 
informal water markets are noted mainly among irrigators, or 
between irrigators and urban users, during scarcity or periods of  
rising water prices. Those who sell or donate water can receive 
different forms of  compensation, such as a financial value agreed 
to for each cubic meter, infrastructure investments, or even a 
change to water of  a different origin or quality (DE STEFANO; 
HERNÁNDEZ-MORA, 2016).
However, Act 46/1999, dated December 13 (ESPAÑA, 
1999), amended the Water Law so that water markets were officially 
approved in the Spanish legal system, resulting in flexibility of  
the concessions regime. The model adopted was based on the 
California water markets created in 1991 (SAURÍ; DEL MORAL, 
2001). Embid Irujo (2016) warns that, under a rigorous conception 
of  the terms, and considering that in Spain the waters are public 
and inalienable property, Law 46/1999 does not refer to water 
markets, but to “water use rights negotiation markets.” This means 
that it is not water that is subject to change, purchase, or sale, but 
the rights to use it. However, the literature has consolidated the 
generalization of  the water market term for any type of  water 
negotiation in Spain.
Therefore, from Law 46/1999, the State adopted the 
argument that the concessions regime did not adequately deal with 
the lawsuits system, which was intensified by the heavy drought 
of  the early 1990s. This context has fomented the water use rights 
market so that underutilized resources could be ceded to other 
users and meet more active, urgent, or priority demands (PÉREZ 
GONZÁLEZ, 2006). According to the Law, negotiations must 
be carried out with users who are already holders of  concessions, 
and whose uses are considered priorities. In that sense, public 
institutions have preference in the use rights acquisition, and 
basin organizations can prohibit negotiations if  they are contrary 
to the general interest. Another principle to be addressed is that 
basin organizations should promote water markets in periods 
of  drought or extreme events. When negotiations take place 
between right holders from different basins, State authorization 
(General Direction for Water, part of  the Ministry of  Agriculture, 
Food and Environment) is required for the use of  channels that 
connect watersheds.
With the mentioned Law, the possibility of  use rights 
negotiations arose through two legal entities: the “Exchange 
Centers” and the “Contracts for the Water Rights Assignment” 
(ARROJO; LA-ROCA, 2015). The latter are held between users 
holding concessions or rights to private use of  water. A user may 
transfer to another all or part of  the use rights during a certain time, 
with corresponding compensation and previous State administrative 
authorization. This mechanism was activated by the Royal Decree 
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Law 15/2005 of  December 16 to deal with urgent measures for 
the regulation of  water use rights negotiations (ESPAÑA, 2005).
The first formal negotiations for water use rights in Spain 
occurred in 2001 (PALOMO-HIERRO, GÓMEZ-LIMÓN, 2016). 
In a historical and dominant panorama of  the hydraulic paradigm 
aimed at increasing the water supply continually, the State conceived 
the exchanges as an alternative to interbasin water transfers, 
avoiding the high political, socioeconomic, and environmental 
costs of  these infrastructure works (HERNÁNDEZ- MORA; 
DEL MORAL, 2015). The costs became clear in the proposals 
for the Ebro River transfer in the National Hydrological Plan of  
2000, leading later governments to abandon the idea under the 
strong social pressures coordinated by the “New Water Culture” 
movement (MARTÍNEZ GIL, 1997). In addition, exchanges 
would have the advantages of  being able to reinforce the water 
economic dimension for users, motivate rational water use because 
it is a scarce resource, and prevent situations of  use restriction in 
scarcity periods in urban areas close to irrigated zones.
The urgency resulted from the severe 2005-2010 drought 
that affected almost all of  Spain. The contracts allowed a water 
market between users of  the Guadalquivir and Tagus river basins 
and the Mediterranean basins of  the Almanzora and Segura 
rivers, respectively. For Gil Olcina and Rico Amorós (2015), 
these experiences involved relatively low water volumes, but, 
nevertheless, they provided undeniable benefits to the basins. 
In the case of  the donor basins, part of  the resources was invested 
in the modernization of  irrigation systems.
Hernández-Mora and Del Moral (2016) have different 
opinions; the water market developed between users of  the Tajo 
and Segura basins during the 2005–2010 drought; as the main 
Spanish experience with concession contracts, it has only served 
to intensify the pressures on local ecosystems. The sale of  water 
from the headwaters of  the Tagus River would have benefited 
the users, but at the expense of  a worsening of  the basin’s water 
situation, which already suffered from drought effects. Therefore, 
profits would have been accrued at the expense of  the general 
interest of  society, which subsidizes the negotiations. For the 
authors, this experience shows that, in cases of  unequal access to 
power and information, markets reinforce the lack of  transparency 
and intensify inequalities in power relations. In previous work 
(HERNÁNDEZ-MORA; DEL MORAL, 2015), the authors 
have criticized the process of  “water mercantilization” in Spain 
in recent years. This process would intensify from the gradual 
replacement of  water allocation techniques, based on public 
concession policies by market instruments.
For Gil Olcina and Rico Amorós (2015), one of  the main 
compromising factors of  the Assignment Contracts expansion was 
the absence of  connecting infrastructures between watersheds in 
regions most vulnerable to droughts and watersheds in regions 
with higher water availability. Without a spatially well-distributed 
network, water use rights negotiations could not occur in several 
situations. The market for water use rights, in this case, was limited 
precisely by the lack of  hydraulic structures. Complementing this 
underutilization context of  the Assignment Contracts, the severe 
2005–2010 drought limited the offer of  rights sales and increased 
the values demanded by the yielding basins in proportion to the 
urgent needs of  the more disadvantaged basins-a typical reflection 
of  market laws.
In turn, the Water Rights Exchange Centers are created by 
the basin organizations and allow the State to make public offers to 
obtain use rights in exchange for financial compensation to users, 
as well as rights offers acquired in exchange for a price (ARROJO; 
LA-ROCA, 2015). The Centers have the function, therefore, to 
make it possible to hold public offers for the temporary or definitive 
acquisition of  water use rights from public concessionaires or 
private owners. In this way, they transform private water ownership 
into public property (EMBID IRUJO, 2016). Negotiations occur 
from offer disclosures by the Centers.
The Water Exchange Centers were activated by a Royal 
Decree-Law of  2006, which dealt with urgent measures to minimize 
the drought effects. They were operated in the Guadiana, Júcar 
and Segura river basins between 2006 and 2007 (GIL OLCINA; 
RICO AMORÓS, 2015). In these watersheds, the State (water 
management) acquired irrigation use rights and at the same time 
urged the recovery of  overexploited aquifers and the guarantee 
of  maintenance of  environmental flows, but few negotiations 
were put in practice and involved relatively small water volumes. 
Arrojo and La-Roca (2015) consider that, of  the three experiences 
mentioned, the most significant were those of  the Alto Guadiana, 
to permanent rights, and the Alto Júcar, to temporary rights.
Thus, the creation of  the Exchange Centers is generally 
limited to special water conditions/periods–when there is a critical 
reduction of  water availability. Mainly in prolonged drought periods, 
the Centers are considered good alternatives for negotiations 
between the countryside and the city in the sense of  seeking to 
guarantee urban supply in exchange for obtaining water surpluses 
from irrigation. The agricultural sector, which accounts for about 
80% of  consultative water uses in Spain, plays a decisive role 
in the use rights markets, since it is the main source of  surplus 
resources in times of  the greatest urban and hydroelectric use needs 
(NAREDO, 2008). Therefore, it is necessary for public authorities 
to guarantee investment in infrastructure, implement instruments 
to facilitate exchanges, media, and connections between users and 
water users, as well as “[…] stable frameworks of  reference, and 
not [...] last minute reactions in scarcity moments” (ESPAÑA, 
2009, p. 57).
With the legal possibility of  maintaining groundwater 
private use rights, negotiations in real markets were developed 
in certain regions. As an example, at the beginning of  the 2000s, 
almost all groundwater of  Tenerife Island was private and subject 
to a purchase and sale market (AGUILERA KLINK; SÁNCHEZ 
PADRÓN, 2002). Motivated by the lack of  public investments, 
several private initiatives agglutinated in users’ associations 
achieved prospecting of  underground springs by means of  wells 
and galleries. When resources were found, they were distributed in 
proportion to individual investments. Among the conclusions, the 
authors emphasize that the prices of  this market do not generally 
reflect water scarcity and quality, but rather agreements between 
brokers. It must be said that in the Canary Islands, another Water 
Law applies because of  historical issues related to its model of  
conquest and population since the 15th century; hence, the water 
ownership regime is being deprived.
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The subject of  water use rights market is subject to 
controversy and hot debates, not only in Spain. The market idea 
provokes distrust regarding any proposal of  openness in the 
water resources management sector, with frequent criticism about 
water mercantilization and public services privatization. In this 
sense, Hernández-Mora and Del Moral (2016, p. 451) affirm 
that “[…] the introduction of  water markets in Spain has not 
faced a solid ideological opposition”. The authors argue that the 
practical application of  market instruments requires a considerable 
institutional effort in the application of  regulatory-deregulation 
processes, which is only possible from the effective intervention 
of  the public power. They also state that, in this context, the 
institutional development of  water rights markets in Spain has 
always been strongly influenced by pressures from power groups 
in the country’s southeastern part–that is, Spain’s driest region. 
These groups–mainly the tourist-residential and export agricultural 
sectors–compromise the developing of  general interest in efficient 
markets.
For Naredo (2008, p. 14), the idea of  an “[…] absolutely 
free or decontextualized market does not exist […]”, since its 
existence depends on a solid institutional framework and defined 
property rights to enable its operation. As much of  the Public 
Water Domain remains private and the concession system is 
inefficient and “paternalistic”, the author reinforces that the main 
problem in Spain is not the existence of  water markets, but rather 
their absence, which prevents implementation of  a flexible users’ 
negotiations system.
However, assuring smooth functioning of  the Exchange 
Centers is not easy. Challenges include defining the available renewable 
river flows in relation to property rights and the concessions 
and water use context, attributing security to the negotiations. 
Another issue is compatibility between the concession flexibility 
criterion and regulation of  the concessions regime and water use 
rights, including the revision of  the administrative concessions 
instrument, as well as the Centers’ operation regulations, based 
on well-established and audited standards (NAREDO, 2008).
As claimed by several authors, the water use rights market 
in Spain has had a rather limited development, not fulfilling its 
potential because of  the near trade limitation in the most critical 
periods of  drought, almost disappearing during higher water 
availability periods. Except for the most critical phases, such as 
the 2005-2010 drought, the market has been virtually inactive. 
Other reasons include the mentioned need for waste transfer 
infrastructures negotiated between basins, as well as the irrigators’ 
cultural resistance to carry out the negotiations. For many users, 
negotiating use rights represents assuming conditions of  water 
excess in their concessions, taking risks to attract State attention 
for rights revision and for possible granted volumes reduction. 
There is also the vision that the agricultural sector would be 
assuming a certain fragility in relation to the other water users’ 
sectors, weakening their traditional power in public policies 
(HERNÁNDEZ-MORA; DEL MORAL, 2015).
Therefore, water management public institutions have 
been criticized for not creating alternatives to motivate and 
make possible a well-structured water market system. The lack 
of  information regarding data basis generation and organization 
and the lack of  transparency in their disclosure are also criticized. 
As Hernández-Mora and Del Moral (2016, p. 23) affirm, “[…] 
there are currently no official figures on the negotiations number, 
negotiated volumes, prices paid or agents acting in these markets”.
The apparent brightness that the water use rights market 
brings to the eyes of  many does not seduce some of  the water 
management specialists in Spain. According to Arrojo and 
La-Roca (2015), the opening to the market brought by Water Law 
reform was made by arguments about the need for alternatives 
to an “intense drought” of  the early 1990s, as established by the 
Royal Decree 46/1999 of  December 13. The water concession 
regimes’ flexibility was defended without giving possibilities to 
more than known alternatives, such as the reuse of  gray water 
and treated effluents, as well as desalination. In any case, the water 
market development in Spain is not yet a reality, being restricted 
to theoretical debates and few practical initiatives.
For some authors, rights of  use negotiations through the 
Exchange Centers or Assignment Contracts eventually become 
instruments of  exception to the general rule established by the Water 
Law. Therefore, “[…] the water that is granted will be attached to 
the uses indicated in the concession title, without it being possible 
to apply them to different ones, or to different lands in the case of  
irrigation” (ESPAÑA, 1999, p. 43104). The advocates of  the use 
rights negotiations argued that the water market can avoid many 
hydraulic works. The “invisible hand” of  the market would lead 
the water grant process to more economically important activities, 
freeing the State from worrying about new works to guarantee the 
water supply increase required to meet the increasing demands 
(GOMES, 2015).
However, among the proponents of  the New Water 
Culture, opinions differ on water markets. Authors such as 
Estevan and Naredo (2004) reinforce the importance of  water 
use rights negotiations as instruments to make State concessions 
and water supply systems more flexible. For them, the State must 
install banks and water markets, breaking with the rigidity of  the 
concessions in long periods of  time, which foments inefficiency of  
use. This traditional model does not combat unused water losses 
or promote economic initiatives, especially in terms of  irrigation, 
with frequent payments based on cultivated and irrigated areas 
rather than by volumes of  used water. The authors have expressed 
their views as follows:
When the irregularity is characteristic of  our hydrology, the 
possibility of  transferring water between concessionaires 
and nearby users is a first-rate instrument to ensure the 
supply of  priority uses. A reasonable water management 
requires that the Administration favours voluntary 
water exchanges between nearby users, in the face of  
forced transfers between distant territories. (ESTEVAN; 
NAREDO, 2004, p. 39).
Naredo (2008) warns, paradoxically, that dominant 
private interests do not want water markets to develop in Spain. 
The generalization of  water markets or free exchange centers between 
users would require more transparency and more ordering of  the 
“obscure” picture of  water availability, rights, concessions, and real 
uses of  water in the country, exposing many unfair but favorable 
scenarios to these strong private interests. The solutions include 
the revision of  unfounded projections of  increasing demands and 
the fight against water waste that benefits the corporate sector 
RBRH, Porto Alegre, v. 22, e41, 2017
Magalhães Junior and Curiel
associated with the hydraulic works industry. They also cover 
the revision of  concession systems marked by oversized uses 
for long-term irrigation. An updated and detailed environmental 
information system is, therefore, essential to expose the reality 
of  water availability, demands and uses, and contribute to the 
search for efficiency and fidelity of  the concession apparatus to 
the hydric situation of  each territory.
CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES
Market regulation is a water management priority demanded 
by various civil society entities in Spain (FNCA, 2016). These 
organizations criticize the possibilities of  buying and selling 
water from the Tajo River basin by irrigators in the Segura basin 
through the Tajo-Segura transfer, since these processes establish 
scenarios that are not in accordance with the legal limits imposed 
to protect the yielding watersheds. Another example is the water 
purchase from the Guadiana’s public water bank (Banco Público 
de Aguas del Guadiana), since the Hydrographic Confederation of  
Guadiana (Confederación Hidrográfica del Guadiana) purchased, 
in accordance with the Special Plan of  Alto Guadiana, usage 
rights in the amount of  66 million euros, although a percentage 
of  these rights had not been respected for several years. In this 
sense, the letter delivered at the Congress of  Deputies in April 
2016 proposes, among others, to repeal the legal norm that 
allows the purchase and sale of  concession rights among users 
of  different hydrographic regions. These are the European Union 
territorial water management unities proposed in the WFD (called 
Demarcaciones Hidrográficas in Spain).
In addition to the instrument for granting long-term 
water use rights, Spain also applies time-limited administrative 
authorizations for the Public Hydraulic Domain use, as in the cases 
of  navigation and sediment extraction from river beds. The RTWA 
also determines that the discharge of  contaminating effluents 
into the environment is subject to the need for administrative 
authorization from the competent authority under the “polluter 
pays” principle.
Brufao (2008) takes a rather critical view of  the water 
concessions system in Spain. The lack of  State policies will would 
block any attempt to reform the legal apparatus, so that a concession 
can be extended in time, even by more than a century, according 
to the transitional provisions of  each legal reform. Its content 
would be blocked by their consideration as benes patrimoniales 
irreformables salvo expropriación, that is “[…] irreplaceable patrimonial 
assets except expropriation” (BRUFAO, 2008, p. 54), although the 
jurisprudence is modifying these budgets to correspond to the 
application of  environmental and protected areas laws.
Despite advances in the implementation of  the concessions 
of  the water use rights instrument, in several Spanish regions there 
remain important imbalances between granted and used volumes, 
thanks to concessions that are not respectful of  the water and 
ecosystems reality. It is common for basin cases with water volumes 
to exceed the existing water availability. In part, this problem 
results from the widespread scenario of  conscious available flows 
oversizing, an issue related to the adoption of  hydrological data 
from a long historical series for average annual flow calculations and 
the lack of  river systems studies. Many basin plans have adopted 
data series initiated in the 1940-1941 hydrological year. However, 
in the last 25 years, significant reductions in rainfall and river flows 
have been observed in much of  the country, and this picture tends 
to worsen in the coming years (ESPAÑA, 2007). This reduction 
was even foreseen in the 2008 Hydrological Planning Instruction 
(Instrucción de Planificación Hidrológica) regarding the guidelines 
for the river basin plans revision in 2027, with an estimated rainfall 
reduction of  2-3% in the country’s northern area and 11% in the 
south (OLCINA CANTOS et al., 2016). Several studies estimate 
reductions in river flows to reflect these changes, mainly in the 
Mediterranean Arc (AYALA-CARCEDO, 1996; SÁNCHEZ 
NAVARRO; MARTÍNEZ FERNÁNDEZ, 2008; DEL MORAL; 
OLCINA CANTOS, 2015). Therefore, the means resulting from 
a long hydrological data series may distort the reality.
Changes in climate variables in recent decades and the 
future scenarios of  maintenance and aggravation of  these trends 
have been profusely mentioned in studies and debates on water 
management in Spain. Therefore, water irrigation concessions 
often refer to much higher flows than the existing ones and 
the effective water needs for crops. As an aggravating factor, 
concessions contemplate water volumes much higher than those 
granted for water losses in distribution systems and deficiencies 
in irrigation systems, although modernization has been verified 
in recent years (NAREDO, 2008).
The need for revision of  the concession system, based on 
data banks and safe and up-to-date information covering water 
availability and real water demands and uses, is a matter on which 
most specialists agrees. These banks should operate with more 
transparency and ensure society’s access to data. Information is an 
essential condition for adequate water management, and progress 
in this regard depends on political will. An efficient and honest 
information system that subsidizes water management is, therefore, 
dependent on the willingness of  the management apparatus to 
counter decisions based on hydrological subjectivity and combat 
existing technical corruption in the “[…] uncritical use of  data 
without a valid statistical birth certificate, as a common basis for 
projections and models” (NAREDO, 2008, p. 21).
The widespread illegal use of  water resources, whether 
from surface springs or aquifers, also compromises the demands 
scenarios foreseen in basin plans, mainly in the most problematic 
basins, such as those of  the Júcar, Segura or Guadiana rivers. 
According to OPPA (2015), management plans for hydrographic 
regions do not include strong measures for the control of  illegal 
extractions, or in protected and internationally recognized spaces 
such as Doñana National Park in the Guadalquivir Basin. In certain 
basins, such as in the Segura River area, a stated concern follows:
Pernicious policy of  consummated facts and amnesty 
to illegal irrigators “of  past times,” also allowing the 
expansion of  illegal irrigated areas and the existence of  
illegal water abstractions. (OPPA, 2015, p. 7).
In several irrigated areas, such as in the Tajo River 
Basin, 20% of  the water is extracted above the granted volumes 
(ESPAÑA, 2009). The unregistered and unofficially authorized 
irrigated areas create imbalances in projections and water balances 
in terms of  availabilities and demands, reducing the potential of  
plans to contribute to land use planning. In this way, Spain offers 
worrisome cases of  “[…] rights without flow and flow extractions 
without rights” (NAREDO, 2008, p. 15).
RBRH, Porto Alegre, v. 22, e41, 2017
Instruments of  administrative concessions of  water use rights in Spain
CONCLUSIONS
An erroneous but widespread belief  is that the WFD 
affects ownership regimes or water ownership in European Union 
countries. The directive has simply established performance 
requirements regarding the status of  water bodies in terms of  
quality and quantity. In Spain, almost all surface waters are public, 
whereas about 80% of  the underground waters are private. This 
picture has not been changed by the WFD.
On the other hand, WFD objectives influence the logic 
as water managers apply concessional systems, one aspect of  the 
use of  public goods. The Spanish water concessions system is a 
strategic instrument for implementation of  the WFD´s principles. 
Proper functioning of  the legal and institutional concession 
apparatus is essential for water/land-use control, but there are 
several challenges to achieving this standard.
For many civil society entities, the current concessions 
system, particularly as it relates to the hydroelectric and agricultural 
sectors, represents an obstacle for reaching and maintaining the 
good ecological status of  water bodies, considering the high 
abstraction pressure in several hydrographic regions (FNCA, 
2016). These entities also criticize that part of  the concessions is 
oversized or does not fit the reality of  basins’ water availability, 
or, as already mentioned, does not consider the climate change 
variables in the last decades. Thus, a reform of  the concession 
system is required, including the revision of  terms and granted 
water volumes. Criticism also extends to mineral water regulation 
and seaside resort concessions, which have a different legal regime 
inspired by mining legislation.
The Spanish water concessions framework receives much 
criticism from social sectors concerned about the lack of  adequate 
water use control. There is disapproval for the long terms of  
concessions and the lack of  a data and information efficient 
system to support decision-making. Many uses remain completely 
hidden from the officials. To a large extent, these situations result 
from private uses of  groundwater and the control of  thousands 
of  wells outside administrative action. Many wells are illegal and 
the used volumes are not registered, thus compromising current 
and estimated flows that can be granted. For several specialists, 
maintenance of  this situation addresses the interests of  the 
dominant economic sectors of  the water system: agricultural and 
hydroelectric. Without adequate strategies for water concessions, 
other management instruments are also committed, such as the 
definition of  ecological flows.
In parallel to the concessions system, water markets 
can contribute to minimizing problems in certain basins during 
critical drought periods. Negotiations for water use rights between 
concessionaires is a valued perspective in the country, but more 
incentives from the State are needed.
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